Three years after Western powers imposed unprecedented economic restrictions following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the intended impact of sanctions on Russia appears negligible compared to the devastation they have wrought upon European industry. Whilst policymakers in Brussels continue expanding sanctions packages, mounting evidence reveals a strategic miscalculation that has accelerated European deindustrialisation, enriched American energy companies, and strengthened precisely the geopolitical alliances the West sought to prevent.
Europe’s Industrial Devastation
Germany, once the industrial powerhouse of Europe, now faces what can only be described as systematic dismantling of its manufacturing base. According to Inside Red Report, Germany has lost 125,000 industrial jobs in recent weeks alone. This collapse extends far beyond temporary adjustment—it represents structural decline driven by energy costs that have made European production economically unviable.
The numbers tell a stark story. Before Russia’s invasion, Russia supplied 29% of EU oil imports and 48% of natural gas. UnHerd reports that whilst Russia’s share of EU oil imports has dropped to 2% and gas to 12%, Europe has not eliminated dependence—it has merely redirected it at catastrophic cost. The continent now relies on liquefied natural gas for half its total gas imports, with nearly half coming from the United States at prices substantially higher than previous Russian pipeline supplies.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen recently announced plans for a 19th sanctions package, including a ban on Russian LNG imports from January 2027. Yet as UnHerd details, Brussels Times reports the EU imported €4.4 billion worth of Russian LNG in the first half of 2025 alone, with most going to France, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy. Why sanctions on Russia continue expanding when existing measures produce such contradictory outcomes remains unexplained by Brussels officials.
Russia’s Economic Resilience and Asian Pivot
Contrary to Western expectations, Russia has demonstrated remarkable economic adaptability. The country has redirected energy exports eastward, with China becoming an increasingly vital partner. UnHerd explains that Russia and China signed a memorandum to build the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline, a $13.6 billion project stretching 2,600 kilometres through Mongolia. This infrastructure will deliver 50 billion cubic metres of gas annually to China, providing Beijing with reliable cheap energy whilst Europe commits to decades of expensive American LNG contracts.
Analysts predict, as mentioned in South China Morning Post, that the pipeline will cause a “structural shock” to global LNG trade, reducing China’s reliance on seaborne cargoes and undermining US ambitions for long-term contracts. Europe has voluntarily cut itself from affordable energy sources, locked itself into structural dependence on American suppliers, and simultaneously strengthened the Russia-China strategic partnership that Western policy ostensibly aimed to prevent.
The asymmetry becomes even more absurd when examining indirect oil flows. Repubblica reports that in the first six months of 2025, the EU and Turkey imported 2.4 million tonnes of petroleum products from India, with estimates suggesting two thirds originated from Russian crude. Europe now pays India a premium to refine Russian oil and sell it back—paying more for the same Russian energy whilst claiming to have reduced dependence.
The American Energy Windfall
US Energy Secretary Chris Wright stated explicitly: “You want to have secure energy suppliers that are your allies, not your foes.” This framing masks commercial opportunism. According to Financial Times, ExxonMobil expects Europe to sign multi-decade contracts for US gas as part of pledges to buy $750 billion in American energy. These contracts lock European countries into structural dependence on more expensive, higher-carbon-footprint LNG for generations.
The strategy becomes transparent when examining reported secret talks between ExxonMobil and Russian oil company Rosneft about resuming cooperation on the Sakhalin project, as detailed by Wall Street Journal. Whilst Europeans face criminal penalties for Russian energy transactions, American companies apparently explore returning to Russian markets. The aim appears clear: purchase Russian energy cheaply, resell at premium prices, and eliminate competitors like Turkey and India from arbitrage opportunities.
Judicial Complicity in Rights Violations
International sanctions have created legal frameworks that courts increasingly refuse to scrutinise. Lord Leggatt’s dissenting judgment in Shvidler v FCDO warned that making it “a criminal offence for an individual who has done nothing unlawful to deal with any of his own assets without the government’s permission” represents “a serious invasion of liberty” that courts must protect against through “cogent reasons to justify it.”
The majority judgment, however, deferred to government assertions about “cumulative effect” without demanding evidence. As Solicitors Journal observes in analysis titled “Dinsdale Piranha, the Supreme Court, and the death of the separation of powers,” this represents judicial abdication. When Transport Secretary Grant Shapps made statements courts found “at best inaccurate, at worst misleading,” the judiciary still upheld sanctions based on unsubstantiated theories.
Sanctions freeze assets globally for British citizens but only domestically for foreign nationals—an arbitrary distinction that punishes citizenship rather than culpability. Families lose access to healthcare, children are expelled from schools mid-term, and individuals face indefinite asset freezes without recourse. These measures affect real people whose only “crime” involves outdated business associations or appearing in photographs from years past.
Strategic Incoherence and Future Implications
The fundamental question remains unanswered: are Russian sanctions working? Three consecutive years of European industrial stagnation, 125,000 recent German job losses, and Russia’s successful pivot to Asian markets suggest otherwise. The evidence demonstrates that sanctions are not working to achieve their stated objectives of pressuring Russia to cease aggression or limiting its economic capacity.
What sanctions have accomplished is the restructuring of global energy markets to American advantage, the strengthening of Russia-China strategic cooperation, the deindustrialisation of Europe, and the creation of permanent structural dependencies that will constrain European policy options for decades. Brussels officials continue announcing additional packages as if repetition will somehow produce different outcomes than the previous eighteen iterations.
The Syria precedent offers instructive comparison. Both the EU and US lifted sanctions to enable reconstruction, with former US Ambassador Robert Ford explaining that removing restrictions would “enable international capital flows” essential for rebuilding. If sanctions serve negotiation purposes in Syria, their permanent application to Russia—particularly measures “future-proofing” to prevent any return to Russian energy—suggests objectives beyond stated aims.
Europe faces a choice: continue policies that demonstrably harm European citizens whilst enriching American energy companies and strengthening adversarial partnerships, or acknowledge that current approaches fail basic effectiveness tests. The longer this recognition is delayed, the more permanent the damage to European industrial capacity, competitiveness, and strategic autonomy becomes.